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Does Anyone Know the Answer to
that Question? Individual Differences
in Judging Answerability
Bodil S. A. Karlsson*, Carl Martin Allwood and Sandra Buratti
Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
Occasionally people may attempt to judge whether a question can be answered
today, or if not, if it can be answered in the future. For example, a person may
consider whether enough is known about the dangers of living close to a nuclear
plant, or to a major electricity cable, for them to be willing to do so, and state-
authorities may consider whether questions about the dangers of new technologies
have been answered, or in a reasonable future can be, for them to be willing to
invest money in research aiming develop such technologies. A total of 476 participants,
for each of 22 knowledge questions, either judged whether it was answerable today
(current answerability), or judged when it could be answered (future answerability).
The knowledge questions varied with respect to the expected consensus concerning
their answerability: consensus questions (high expected consensus), non-consensus
questions (lower expected consensus), and illusion questions (formulated to appear
answerable, but with crucial information absent). The questions’ judged answerability
level on the two scales was highly correlated. For both scales, consensus questions
were rated more answerable than the non-consensus questions, with illusion questions
falling in-between. The result for the illusion questions indicates that a feeling of
answerability can be created even when it is unlikely that somebody can come up with
an answer. The results also showed that individual difference variables influenced the
answerability judgments. Higher levels of belief in certainty of knowledge, mankind’s
knowledge, and mankind’s efficacy were related to judging the non-consensus
questions as more answerable. Participants rating the illusion questions as answerable
rated the other answerability questions as more, or equally, answerable compared to the
other participants and showed tendencies to prefer a combination of more epistemic
default processing and less intellectual processing.
Keywords: question answerability, judgments, consensus, epistemic beliefs, epistemic preference, optimism
INTRODUCTION
In daily life and in science people are sometimes faced with questions that they do not immediately
know the answer to. Examples are questions such as “Is it safe to use a cell-phone daily?”, “Can
this person be considered guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?”, or “Does this medicine have serious
side eﬀects?” Moreover, if a person thinks that a question currently has not been answered, they
may consider how long it will take before it will be answered, or if it can be answered at all. For
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other questions, people may think they know the answer, only
to ﬁnd out that their judgment was premature. Many tragic
human catastrophes may, at least in part, have occurred because
people misjudged the answerability of important questions, e.g.,
the Thalidomide catastrophe in the 1950s.
The notion that questions can have correct answers is
commonly taken for granted in everyday life and in science. In
the present research, we use the term answer to mean an answer
that is correct and that is provided with good arguments at a
relevant level of speciﬁcation. In this context there are thorny
philosophical issues related to, for example, the concepts of
truth and knowledge that have been debated by philosophers for
centuries. However, this paper does not try to solve such issues.
Thus, for example, at a philosophical level, it may presently
not be possible to convincingly claim that there is an absolute
diﬀerence between answerable and non-answerable questions. In
spite of this, we note that people, both in science and in everyday
life in fact make judgments about when in the future, questions
judged not to have been answered, are likely to be so, if ever.
The present study investigated people’s subjective judgments of
questions’ answerability.
Such judgments are important because they may inﬂuence
other judgments and decisions relevant in everyday life, for
example decisions whether to allow new techniques or substances
in speciﬁc contexts such as in medicines, clothes, foods,
or building materials. An example of a future answerability
judgment is how many test trials should be made before we can
be sure that a new drug is not dangerous to the public? Other
contexts where answerability judgments are made in everyday
life, including work life, concern allocation of resources to
research project applications or to public and other inquiries.
For example, if it is reasonable to think that a research project
can answer its questions during the time the research money
is applied for? As far as we know no research has studied
answerability judgments in the broad sense discussed here.
Much of previous research on question answerability
judgments has been limited to questions where people tend to
agree on the answer and has tended to study isolated aspects
of the broader answerability question, for example, if I myself
or someone else knows the answer to a posed question. Thus,
studies of “I know/don’t know” judgments have been made in
diﬀerent ﬁelds of psychology. To illustrate, research in forensic
psychology has explored participants’ ability to separate out
questions on “information not seen” in a video clip (e.g., Candel
et al., 2007; Roebers et al., 2007; Scoboria et al., 2008; Frey and
Scoboria, 2012; Buratti et al., 2014), in general ﬁnding a lack in
this ability. In this context, Frey and Scoboria (2012) suggested
a certain mental ability called “skill” that denotes the ability to
separate an answerable from a non-answerable question with
respect to information (not) seen. In experimental memory
research “Don’t know” judgments have been studied for various
types of simple semantic and episodic information (e.g., Kolers
and Palef, 1976; Glucksberg and McCloskey, 1981; Hampton
et al., 2012). Glucksberg and McCloskey (1981) concluded that
when people attempt to answer a question, a memory search is
ﬁrst made to identify facts that may be relevant to the question,
and if found, then such facts are further considered in detail
in order to assess if they can be used to answer the question.
In a study with several experiments, Hampton et al. (2012)
tested if people can use awareness of their ignorance to deliver
improved test consistency over time. Their results showed that
there is certain factual knowledge that the participants saw as
“known unknowns”, that is, facts that they consistently knew
that they did not know. When the participants answered general
knowledge questions, there existed a high consistency between
test and retest in answers if they were allowed to answer “I don’t
know” in addition to “TRUE” and “FALSE”. Thus, participants
gave stable unsure responses to certain items. However, these
results were not found for other types of knowledge, for example,
autobiographical memories, beliefs and aspiration.
Research on people’s conﬁdence in their answers to diﬀerent
types of memory questions has in many contexts found a
tendency for people to show overconﬁdence in their responses
(see review by Griﬃn and Brenner, 2004). Overconﬁdence is
especially common when the issue considered is less well known
to the person. Research on metacognition in psychology has
also investigated judgments of others’ knowledge. To illustrate,
Johansson and Allwood (2007) found that students were more
conﬁdent in other students’ general almanac knowledge than in
their own. However, although the level and accuracy of people’s
conﬁdence may inﬂuence the processes generating answerability
judgments, no conﬁdence judgments were collected in the
present research and for many of the questions used in the
present research there is no general consensus on their correct
answer.
Beliefs about diﬀerences in knowledge between individuals
and groups (e.g., experts and laypeople) have been addressed
in educational psychology orientated toward science
communication (e.g., Hofer and Pintrich, 2002; Scharrer
et al., 2013, 2014; Shtulman, 2013) and in risk research (e.g.,
Kahan et al., 2011). This line of research shows that individual
diﬀerences may contribute to how people experience the
credibility of knowledge and knowing in general, in diﬀerent
domains. For example, Shtulman (2013, p. 207) studied
students’ epistemic attitudes to two types of belief: scientiﬁc
and supernatural. The results showed that the participants’
conﬁdence in both types of beliefs was more clearly related
to their experienced social consensus about the belief and less
related to their ability to provide justiﬁcations for their beliefs.
Furthermore, also relevant to the present research the most
common form of justiﬁcation was “deference to the opinions and
conclusions of others”.
Evidence in risk research shows that diﬀerences
in cultural values such as hierarchical/egalitarian and
individualistic/communitarian may shape individuals’ beliefs
about the existence of scientiﬁc consensus on such topics as
climate change and disposal of nuclear waste (Kahan et al., 2011).
Other research in this area has indicated that for some issues
people believe that there are clear limits to what experts and
science can know (Sjöberg, 2001). This type of diﬀerences in the
approach to knowledge and science in general may well aﬀect
question answerability judgments.
Conceptions about ignorance are also likely to be important
when people make answerability judgments. For example, if
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people think that very little is known in an area, they may
think that questions relating to the area are less likely to be
answered. Risk researchers (e.g., Ravetz, 1987, 1993; Faber et al.,
1992), sociologists (e.g., Smithson, 1993; Gross, 2007; Croissant,
2014), computer scientists (e.g., Armour, 2000) and philosophers
(e.g., Rescher, 2009; van Woudenberg, 2009) have discussed
ignorance, taken in a broad sense. Researchers have also presented
taxonomies of ignorance (e.g., Faber et al., 1992; Smithson,
1993; Armour, 2000; Gross, 2007; Rescher, 2009; Croissant,
2014). For example the taxonomy of Armour (2000) highlights
that ignorance can be more or less deep. Faber et al.’s (1992)
taxonomy is also relevant in the present context since it separates
communal ignorance (the ignorance of a group) from individual
ignorance (the ignorance of a person). The question answerability
judgments examined in the present study potentially include
deliberations about the ignorance of other people or groups,
including the whole of mankind. As far as we know, such
question answerability judgments have not been thoroughly
studied before. The present study contributes by studying broad
answerability judgments of questions about factual states of the
world where the answer may not be generally agreed upon or
simply is unknown.
Answerability judgments can be classiﬁed in diﬀerent ways.
For example, they can be seen as a divergent thinking task because
the person facing an answerability judgment may consider
several alternative interpretations of, or answers to, the question
that is judged (see e.g., Gilhooly et al., 2007, on divergent thinking
tasks). For answerability judgments of questions, people may ﬁrst
consider if they have heard the speciﬁc question before, and if
they or someone else may know the answer. If so, the question
may be judged to be answerable. Later they may make other
more general considerations, for example with respect to how
much is known in the area the question belongs to, if there are
alternative meanings to the question, or if general ways that the
question could be answered can be thought of. They may also
consider if it is likely that the answer to the question will ever be
found, and if so, how long time it will take, for example based on
the amount of work required to answer it. Each of these aspects
may lead to further deliberations.
A common conclusion is that people have a tendency to
trust socially prevalent understanding (e.g., Perkins, 1993; Cole,
1996; Atran et al., 2005). Socially prevalent understanding will
henceforth be called consensus knowledge and consensus is
seen as a matter of degree. In general, it seems reasonable
that people may often seek guidance from what they conceive
of as common opinions and attitudes in their environment
when making answerability judgments. This guidance may take
place both with respect to the answer to the question judged
(answer consensus) and with respect to question answerability
(answerability consensus). There are at least three types of
possible answerability consensus: whether there is some answer
to the question today, whether it can be answered in the
future, and about the answerability of speciﬁc types of questions.
Koriat (2008, 2012) showed elegantly that main trends in
socially prevalent understanding are an important inﬂuence on
individuals. To illustrate, Koriat (2008) found high conﬁdence
both when individuals in a two-alternative general knowledge
task selected the commonly believed answer alternative that
was also the correct answer, and when individuals selected the
commonly believed, but incorrect, answer.
In this research we investigated answerability judgments of
three types of questions: questions for which we expected a high
degree of consensus regarding their answerability (consensus
questions), questions for which we expected a low degree
of such answerability consensus (non-consensus questions),
and questions that may appear answerable but where some
information necessary to answer it was missing (illusion
questions). However, we do not claim that there is an absolute
qualitative diﬀerence between these question types, rather the
diﬀerence may be a question of degree. Consensus and non-
consensus questions were used in this research because it is
of interest to study the consistency in people’s answerability
judgments of questions with diﬀerent degrees of expected
answerability. In addition, we were also interested in studying
the degree to which individual diﬀerence variables inﬂuenced
questions with diﬀerent levels of expected consensus about their
answerability (further elaborated below). The illusion questions
were included in order to examine the extent to which missing
information in the questions might be compensated for by the
use of other types of information such as conceptions about the
answerability of speciﬁc types of questions.
We expected that consensus questions would be rated higher
in answerability than non-consensus questions (Hypothesis 1).
This was partly because we expected that it would be relatively
easy for the participants to either provide what they thought was
the correct answer to the question (thus showing that is was
answerable), or to imagine some easily performed way to get
the answer to the question. The illusion questions belonged to
geometry and physics and, since we had purposefully eliminated
information necessary to answer them, they show similarity to
the questions used in the witness psychology and memory studies
reviewed above. Moreover, they were designed to appear fairly
elementary and computable and we believed many participants
(possibly from their school experience) would think that the
answer to such elementary computational questions in general
is possible to compute. This is in line with Stahl and Bromme’s
(2007) suggestion that individuals have preconceptions about
the knowledge in diﬀerent knowledge domains and that these
“domain-speciﬁc epistemic beliefs” act as a lens through which
an individual makes judgments of knowledge. Due to the
low number of illusion questions, these were not statistically
compared to the other types of questions in level of answerability.
But in general we expected some, but not all, participants to
notice that information was missing and for this reason that these
questions would be given lower answerability values than the
consensus questions.
Answerability judgments can be made on diﬀerent types of
scales and it is of interest to understand the extent to which
the level of the answerability judgment varies as an eﬀect of the
used scale. Therefore we compared two kinds of answerability
scales with respect to their eﬀect on the level of answerability
judgments. One scale related to the current answerability of the
question and the other scale to when, if ever, a question can be
answered. These two scales were included because it is reasonable
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to think they are commonly used, explicitly or implicitly, when
people judge the answerability of questions in everyday life. In
addition, we were interested to compare the answerability levels
of the judged questions on the two scales since if the rank order in
answerability is stable between the two scales this is an indication
of some stability in the processes generating the answerability
judgments.
Individual Differences and Answerability
Judgments
Given the potential importance of answerability in everyday
life it is also of interest to study if answerability judgments
are inﬂuenced by factors that, per se, may be irrelevant to
their realism. Therefore, we also investigated the relation
between answerability judgments and measures of individuals’
cognitive and personality properties, henceforth called individual
diﬀerence variables, that it seems reasonable to believe will be
associated with the level of the answerability judgments. In
general it would seem that consensus type questions are more
likely to be judged by use of quick and fairly automated processes
of a System 1 kind (e.g., Kahneman, 2011; for debate see e.g.,
Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Keren, 2013). The reason is that
socially prevalent knowledge is more likely to be encountered
more frequently and thus is more likely to be automatized and
taken for granted. In contrast, non-consensus questions may, for
related reasons, be more likely to be judged by less automated,
and more deliberate and elaborated, processing of a System
2 kind. Thus, we believed the individual diﬀerence variables
we studied would have more inﬂuence on the judgments of
the non-consensus questions, compared with the consensus
questions (Hypothesis 2). These variables include beliefs about
epistemological issues (belief in certainty of knowledge, belief
in mankind’s knowledge), belief in mankind’s eﬃcacy, preferred
processing type and personal optimism, and are discussed next.
Belief in Certainty of Knowledge
Personal beliefs about knowledge and knowing in general are
referred to as global epistemic beliefs and can be separated from
domain speciﬁc epistemic beliefs which concern beliefs about
knowledge in speciﬁc domains, such as physics or history. Due
to the broad span of questions used in the present study we were
primarily interested in global aspects of beliefs about epistemic
issues.
Development of global beliefs about certainty of knowledge is
assumed to go from a naïve state in childhood where knowledge
is seen as certain and is distributed by an authority, to a
more sophisticated view where certain (sure) answers may be
out of human reach or context dependent (Perry, 1970). We
expected that the participants would not have strong detailed
personal opinions on every question judged and therefore we
speculated that their ratings would be inﬂuenced by their “general
underlying orientation” (Schuman and Presser, 1996, p. 132)
about certainty of knowledge (see also Hahn and Oaksford,
2007; Kammerer et al., 2013). Thus, we expected that people
who believed more in certainty of knowledge would give higher
answerability ratings (Hypothesis 3). In line with Hypothesis 2,
this diﬀerence was, for this and all the following hypotheses,
expected to hold foremost for the non-consensus questions.
Mankind’s Knowledge
Beliefs about the extent and usefulness of mankind’s knowledge
as such also illustrate belief about epistemic issues. Given that
more knowledge might be expected to be associated with greater
possibility to answer knowledge questions, we hypothesized
that belief in a larger body of mankind’s knowledge would be
correlated with higher answerability judgments (Hypothesis 4).
Mankind’s Efficacy
A further type of belief concerns beliefs about mankind’s
eﬀectiveness to reach, for example, epistemic goals (e.g., the goal
of acquiring knowledge), that is, mankind’s eﬃcacy. We expected
that participants who believed more in mankind’s eﬃcacy would
tend to judge questions as more answerable (Hypothesis 5).
Epistemic Preference
Shallow or deep processing might inﬂuence answerability
judgments. Two kinds of processing preferences are measured
by the EPI-r scale (Elphinstone et al., 2014): preference for a
more automatic default type of processing, EPI-r Default (similar
to system 1 processing) and preference for a deeper intellectual
type of processing measured by EPI-r Intellectual (similar to
system 2 processing). We expected that participants with default
processing preferences would tend to choose interpretations that
come quickly to mind and are easy to handle and therefore would
ﬁnd questions more answerable. Furthermore, we expected
that preference for intellectual processing would be associated
with lower answerability judgments since participants high in
this preference would problematize the possible constructions
of answers to questions more than participants low in this
preference (Hypothesis 6). Our reasoning here was that people
with a higher default processing preference may be more
prone to rely on general rules of thumb (e.g., preconceptions
about a domain or general knowledge beliefs), while intellectual
processing may make it easier to notice that crucial information
needed to answer the question may be missing.
Personal Optimism
Optimism may also aﬀect the level of answerability judgments.
People with generalized personal optimism tend to interpret
things in a positive way and are less likely to give up (Muhonen
and Torkelson, 2005; Carver et al., 2009). As optimists are less
likely to give up goals (for example to answer questions) they
may think that, given enough attempts, answers to questions
will be found. On the other hand, many unsuccessful attempts
to ﬁnd something may lead to a belief that this something does
not exist (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007), but maybe less so for
optimists. A further part of optimism is that optimists expect
good things to happen in uncertain times (Monzani et al., 2014).
This could lead questions being seen as more answerable but also
to better tolerance of uncertainty in the environment. Optimists
may therefore for example be more willing to accept that
answers to questions may be uncertain or non-existing. In sum,
diﬀerent features of optimism seem to be theoretically related to
answerability in diﬀerent ways. Therefore we explored optimism
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in relation to answerability but did not pose a hypothesis in this
context.
METHOD
Participants
In total, 476 participants completed the 22 answerability
questions in one of the two answerability scale variants
(112 men, 313 women, 9 “other”, and 42 “no answer”).
The mean age was 28 years (range 18–78 years). Of the
476 participants, 236 (57 men, 165 women, 6 “other”, and
8 “no answer”; mean age 27 years, range 18–78 years)
completed the answerability questionnaire using the current
answerability scale. The remaining 240 participants (59 men,
154 women, 3 “other”, and 24 “no answer”; mean age 28,
range 18–75 years) used the future answerability scale. As a
reimbursement, participants participated in a lottery for a cinema
ticket.
Design and Procedure
The present study followed ethical guidelines in Sweden
for survey data. Participants were recruited from a pool of
adults that had already actively volunteered and signed up
for participation in psychological research and can thus be
considered consciously aware of participation in general. They
were provided with information about the purpose of the
study via e-mail and were told that participation was not
mandatory. In the email they were informed that their answers
only would be used for research purposes, that they could
withdraw at any time. The email also provided relevant contact
information. Participants gave their consent by clicking on
a survey link. When clicking on the link for participation
participants were randomized to four groups. Approximately half
of the participants were randomized to each of two scale variants:
the current answerability scale and the future answerability
scale (described below). In order to control for any ordering
eﬀects within each scale variant group the order of the question
blocks was altered, constituting two order conditions. In the
ﬁrst order condition (the belief in certainty of knowledge-ﬁrst
condition) the participants answered the belief in certainty of
knowledge items ﬁrst, then the answerability questions, and
then three other measures−the LOT-r, EPI-r, and mankind’s
eﬃcacy, in a randomized order. In the second order condition
(the belief in certainty of knowledge items-last condition) the
participants answered the questions in the following order: ﬁrst
the answerability questions, then the three other measures−the
LOT-r, EPI-r, and mankind’s eﬃcacy−in a randomized order,
and last the belief in certainty of knowledge items. Finally, two
questions about mankind’s knowledge and background questions
were answered.
In total 1462 individuals from participant pools at the
University of Gothenburg were invited to answer a web-
questionnaire. It was not possible to go back to previous pages
in the questionnaire to change answers. If participants left a
question unanswered, they were kindly reminded but not forced,
to complete the question. This rendered 639 answers. Out of these
639, 4761 participants answered all the 22 answerability questions
and data from that set of people were used for further analysis.
Thus, the response rate was 33%.
MATERIALS
Answerability Questionnaire
A questionnaire with 22 questions was prepared. Each question-
item consisted of a question to be judged for answerability.
We attempted to include a varied sample of questions from
diﬀerent domains, for example, medicine, Swedish grammar and
technology (the questions are further described in Appendix 1).
However, at the same time we kept the total number of questions
reasonably low in order to achieve a good response rate and an
even answer quality throughout the questionnaire (Galesic and
Bosnjak, 2009).
Three types of questions were used. There were eight
consensus questions. These were questions for which we expected
a high degree of consensus that the question is answerable.
An example is “What is the name of our galaxy?” There
were 12 non-consensus questions (questions with less expected
consensus about the answerability of the question; for example:
“Are humans causing the green-house eﬀect?”). The remaining
two questions were illusion questions in which a crucial detail
necessary to compute the answer was missing. For example, in
the question “How large is the area of an ellipse with a minor
axis of 2 cm?” the length of the major axis was absent. Bottoms
et al. (2010) found that tricky questions with misleading details
(e.g., the Moses-illusion) were more easily detected if they were
frequent in a questionnaire. For this reason we kept the number
of illusion questions low in order to avoid that participants would
identify this special kind of “trick questions”.
In a pre-study 100 participants from a student pool at
the University of Gothenburg rated various aspects of the 22
question-items. Participants estimated the proportion of adult
Swedes that would agree that the question is answerable (on
a scale from 0% to 100%). On average participants judged
that 74% of the Swedes would agree that the consensus
questions were answerable, but estimated that only 55% of
the Swedish population would agree that the non-consensus
questions were answerable. Participants further judged 64% of
the Swedes would reckon the illusion questions answerable. The
diﬀerence between consensus and non-consensus questions was
signiﬁcant F(2,19) = 23.45, Bonferroni correction (p < 0.01)
which supported the researchers’ intuitions. However, the
illusion questions did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the consensus
(p = 0.14) nor the non-consensus questions, (p = 0.22).
The questions in the present study were organized in pairs
so that questions of diﬀerent categories were matched with
1Nine further participants were excluded since they in response to a manipulation
check question answered before the questions on the individual diﬀerence variables
were answered, understood the current answerability scale as “100% means
that 100% of the population can answer the question.” This interpretation was
identiﬁed in pre-studies by means of a manipulation check multi-alternative
question after the answerability questions. This interpretation could be a
misunderstanding, but it could also serve as a (limited) legitimate strategy for
judging question answerability.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 January 2016 | Volume 6 | Article 2060
Karlsson et al. Individual Differences in Judging Answerability
each other. There were two pairs of questions containing one
illusion and one consensus questions, six pairs containing one
consensus and one non-consensus question, and three pairs
containing two non-consensus questions. The just described
pairs of answerability questions were presented in an order
randomized for each participant.
For both scale variants (the current and future answerability
scales), the instructions stressed that the judgment task was not
to provide the answer as such to the question but to judge the
answerability of the question. Moreover, the participants were
instructed that “answerability means that the question can be
answered on a level that is exact and relevant enough. E.g., for the
question “how tall is the world’s smallest living creature ever”, the
answer “less than a meter” is not exact enough to be counted as
correct.” The instructions are further described in Appendix 2.
Each screen in the questionnaire presented two questions for
which the participants were to give answerability judgments. On
the top of each screen was a reminder formulated as follows:
“Reminder: for the question to be judged as answerable it is
necessary:” (the next three sentences each appeared on its own
line) “That at least one person in the world can answer the
question. That the answer can be answered correctly and that
good arguments for the answer can be provided. That the
question can be answered in a suﬃciently exact and relevant
way.”
Two scales were prepared for the answerability judgments.
One of the scales, “the current answerability scale” asked the
participant to judge the probability that the question could be
answered by at least one person now living in the world. The
other scale, “the future answerability scale”, more openly directed
the judgment to when the question considered can (if ever) be
answered. The two scales are shown in Figure 1.
Belief in Certainty of Knowledge
Two items from a factor tapping belief in certainty of knowledge
in the epistemic beliefs measure presented by Bråten and
Strømsø (2005) were used. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.85. The
two items were “If scientists try hard enough they can ﬁnd
the truth to almost everything” and “Scientists can ultimately
get to the truth”. Higher values indicate higher belief in
certainty of knowledge. The items were rated on a ﬁve-point
scale, ranging from 1 = Do not agree at all to 5 = Totally
agree.
Mankind’s Efficacy
A measure was constructed in order to tap a belief in mankind’s
ability to complete tasks and reach goals. The items were
similar to self-eﬃcacy items, but instead addressed mankind’s
eﬃcacy. The four items were: “Mankind can always manage to
solve diﬃcult problems if it tries hard enough”, “Even if hard
times threaten mankind, mankind will ﬁnd ways to reach its
goals”, “In unexpected situations, mankind will ﬁnd ways to act”,
and “Even in unexpected situations I believe mankind can cope
well”. Items were answered on a ﬁve-point scale ranging from
1 = Do not agree, to 5 = Totally agree. Cronbach’s alpha was
0.77.
Mankind’s Knowledge
Two questions intended to capture beliefs about the extent of
mankind’s entire body of knowledge today were asked. The
two items were “How much does mankind know of all there is
to know?” and “How much does mankind know of all that is
important to know?” Items were answered on a scale ranging from
0 to 100% in intervals of 10. Cronbach’s alpha for the items was
0.66, which although not high can be considered acceptable for
research purposes (Streiner, 2010).
Epistemic Preference (Epi-r)
The Epistemic Preference Indicator-Revised (Elphinstone et al.,
2014) measures processing preferences and is an eight-item
instrument with two dimensions: default processing (for
example, “When confronting the deep philosophical issues of life
I am more inclined to just deal with it, get the job done, and move
on”) and intellectual processing (for example “In the simplest
terms, I have a strong need to study just how and why things
happen”). Questions were answered on a ﬁve-point Likert-type
scale, ranging from 1 = Do not agree to 5 = Agree completely.
Cronbach’s alpha was 0.71 for default processing, and 0.81 for
intellectual processing.
Life Orientation Test Revised (LOT-r)
Life orientation test revised measures the degree of optimism
regarding oneself and has six items (Monzani et al., 2014). An
item example is “In uncertain times, I usually expect the best”. The
items were answered on a ﬁve-point scale ranging from 1 = Do
not agree to 5 = Totally agree. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.78.
RESULTS
Means, medians, SDs, and interquartile range for the
answerability judgments for the three types of questions are
shown in Table 1. Since the future answerability scale starts with
two categories of a nominal type, these categories were recoded
into the same category in order to make the scale more ordinal.
Thus, after recoding 1 = I or someone else knows the answer to
the question, 2 = Can be answered within 1 year, 3 = Can be
answered within 10 years, etc. Medians and interquartile range
were used for the future answerability scale.
As can be seen in Table 1, for the current answerability
judgments, consensus questions were perceived to be most
answerable (M = 93%), non-consensus questions the least
answerable (M = 47%), and illusion questions were rated in
between (M = 77%). Figure A1 in Appendix 3 shows that the
answerability questions’ mean ratings ranged from almost 100%
answerable to approximately 15% answerable.
For the future answerability judgments consensus questions
and illusion questions were rated most answerable (Mdn = 1,
“I or someone else knows the answer to the question”) and the
non-consensus questions least (Mdn = 2.5, corresponds to “Can
be answered within 1–10 years”). Most of the respondents (75th
percentile) rated the non-consensus questions to be answered
within a maximum of 50 years. The response alternative Can
never be answered was chosen 12% of the time.
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FIGURE 1 | The current answerability scale and the future answerability scale.
TABLE 1 | Central tendencies and deviations in the answerability
judgments for the current and the future answerability scales.
Scale
Current Future
Mean SD Median IQR
Question type
Consensus 93 12 1.0 0
Non-consensus 47 21 2.5 4.5
Illusion 77 31 1.0 0
The median refers to median of medians of each question item. IQR = Interquartile
range.
Next, analyzes of the diﬀerences in the answerability
judgments of the consensus and non-consensus items are
presented. After this, the analyses of the inﬂuence of the
individual diﬀerences variables on the answerability judgments
are described. The illusion questions were excluded from these
analyses due to the low number of items in this question category.
The analyses of the illusion questions are presented at the end of
the result section for each scale type.
Difference in Level of Current
Answerability Judgments
In order to investigate diﬀerences between consensus and non-
consensus questions a mixed ANCOVA was conducted with
the within-subject factor of question type (consensus vs. non-
consensus) and, to control for ordering eﬀects, the between-
subject factor order was used (whether the belief in certainty of
knowledge ratings were done before or after the answerability
ratings).2 The six individual diﬀerences variables were entered
2In order to ensure the robustness of the ANCOVA, non-parametric analysis
was also conducted (Friedman, Wilcoxon). Since the result was in line with the
ANCOVA we report only the ANCOVA.
as covariates to control for their inﬂuence (belief in certainty of
knowledge, EPI-default, EPI-intellectual, mankind’s knowledge,
mankind’s eﬃcacy, and optimism).
Consensus questions were rated as signiﬁcantly more
answerable than non-consensus questions, F(1,208) = 35.41,
p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.15. We found no eﬀect of the
order factor (i.e., no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between if the
belief in certainty of knowledge ratings were done before
or after the answerability judgments), F(1,208) = 0.01,
p = 0.942. No interaction eﬀect was found between
the question type and order factors, F(1,208) = 0.25,
p = 0.618.
Difference in Level of Future
Answerability Judgments
Due to the ordinal properties of the future answerability scale
non-parametric tests were used. To estimate the eﬀect sizes the
probability of superiority estimator (PS) was used, following
Grissom and Kim (2012) recommendations. The PS estimates the
probability that a score randomly drawn from population a will
be greater than a score randomly drawn from population b.
A Mann–Whitney U-test showed that there were no
diﬀerences in answerability judgments for the consensus
questions as a consequence of whether the belief in
certainty of knowledge items were rated before or after the
answerability questions (p = 0.957). However, there was
a signiﬁcant diﬀerence for non-consensus questions due
to rating belief in certainty of knowledge before or after
the answerability judgments, U = 8484.50, z = −2.494,
p = 0.013. PS = 0.59. Therefore the results for the future
answerability of the non-consensus questions were analyzed
jointly and separately per order condition and reported when
relevant.
To investigate diﬀerences between future answerability for
the consensus and non-consensus questions a Wilcoxon signed
rank test was used. The consensus questions were rated as being
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possible to answer in a nearer future than the non-consensus
questions, z = 10.24, p < 0.001, PSdep = 0.74.
Correlations Between Current and
Future Answerability Ratings
The median of each question item on the current answerability
scale was correlated with the median of each corresponding
question item on the future answerability scale. This correlation
was signiﬁcant and very high, rs(22) = −0.48, p < 0.03. Thus,
on average, the questions considered unlikely to be answered
today were considered to be answered in a more distant future.
(The negative sign emerges because the future answerability scale
values are higher in a more distant future).
Individual Difference Variables and
Current Answerability
The means and SDs for the individual diﬀerence variables and
the current answerability ratings of consensus, non-consensus
and illusion questions and Pearson correlations between these
variables are shown in Table 2.
Consensus and Non-Consensus Questions
There were no signiﬁcant correlations between the individual
diﬀerences variables and the answerability ratings on the current
answerability scale for the consensus questions. However for
the non-consensus questions, people that rated a high belief in
certainty of knowledge rated these questions as more answerable,
r(226) = 0.28, p < 0.001. Also, people who believed more in
mankind’s eﬃcacy rated the non-consensus questions as more
answerable, r(216) = 0.22, p = 0.001.
In order to explore how much variance in the answerability
ratings of the non-consensus questions was explained by the
individual diﬀerence variables when the current answerability
scale was used, a multiple regression with the dependent
variable answerability of non-consensus questions and the
independent variables belief in certainty of knowledge, EPI-
Default, EPI-Intellectual, mankind’s eﬃcacy, optimism and
mankind’s knowledge was conducted. The result was signiﬁcant
F(4,209) = 5.26, p < 0.001. The regression analysis showed
that the individual diﬀerence variables explained 13% of the
variance in the answerability judgments. Furthermore, belief in
certainty of knowledge (beta value = 0.23), mankind’s eﬃcacy
(beta value = 0.13) and optimism (beta value = −0.14) yielded
signiﬁcant β-values.
Illusion Questions
A negative correlation was found between the answerability
ratings of the illusion questions and optimism, thus, the more
optimistic people rated illusion questions as less answerable,
r(216) = −014, p < 0.047.
One hundred and one participants in the current scale
condition rated both of the illusion questions as 100% answerable,
and were thus “tricked” by the illusion questions. Interestingly,
on average these 101 participants also rated each of the other
questions higher or equally high in answerability compared
to other participants. In order to investigate if epistemic
processing preference diﬀered between the tricked and non-
tricked participants, a general EPI-score was computed with the
formula (EPI-score = 5 + EPI-default – EPI-intellectual, where a
higher score means a higher preference for default processing).
Tricked participants did not score signiﬁcantly higher on the
EPI–score.
Individual Difference Variables and
Future Answerability
The correlations between the future answerability scale and the
individual diﬀerence measures can be found in Table 3.
Consensus and Non-Consensus Questions
No signiﬁcant correlations (p < 0.05) were found between the
consensus questions and the individual diﬀerence measures for
the future answerability scale. As can be seen in Table 3, rating
the non-consensus questions to be more answerable in the
near future was associated with higher ratings for mankind’s
eﬃcacy rs(214) = −0.15, p = 0.028, and mankind’s knowledge
rs(214) = −0.15, p = 0.026.
The correlation between mankind’s knowledge and the
answerability values for the non-consensus questions was
stronger when belief in certainty of knowledge was rated
ﬁrst, rs(113) = −0.27, p = 0.004. Likewise, the correlation
between mankind’s eﬃcacy and the answerability values for the
non-consensus questions was more pronounced when belief
in certainty of knowledge was judged before answerability
judgments, rs(113) = −0.23, p = 0.016.
Illusion Questions
As can be seen in Table 3, rating the illusion questions as being
more answerable in the near future was associated with higher
ratings for mankind’s knowledge rs(214) = −0.14, p = 0.036,
and lower EPI-intellectual rating, rs(214) = 0.19, p = 0.005.
Thus, higher answerability ratings for the illusion questions were
associated with lower values on the EPI-intellectual scale.
In total 182 participants claimed the illusion questions could
be answered today and were thus tricked by the illusion
questions. Comparing the medians, tricked participants judged
each of the other questions to be answered at the same time or
sooner than non-tricked participants. The tricked participants
(n= 182) had a signiﬁcantly lower EPI-score (computed with the
formula EPI-score = 5 + EPI-default – EPI-intellectual, where a
higher score means a higher preference for default processing),
t(432) = −2.20, p = 0.028, d = −2.20.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study investigated judgments of current and future
answerability of three types of knowledge questions: consensus
questions (high level of expected consensus about their
answerability), non-consensus questions (lower expected level
of consensus about their answerability), and illusion questions
(computational questions with crucial information lacking). We
also investigated whether there was a relationship between
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TABLE 2 | Current answerability scale ratings: means and SDs and Pearson correlations between the individual difference variables and the
answerability ratings of the consensus, non-consensus, and illusion questions.
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(1) Belief in certainty of knowledge 2.5 (1.2) 0.29∗∗ −0.02 0.31∗∗ −0.04 0.17∗∗ −0.02 0.28∗∗ 0.03
(2) EPI-default 2.8 (0.91) −0.23∗∗ 0.12∗∗ 0.02 0.20∗∗ 0.07 0.10 −0.08
(3) EPI-intellectual 3.2 (0.96) 0.12∗ −0.07 −0.06 −0.03 −0.09 −0.13
(4) Mankind’s Efficacy 3.3 (0.80) 0.22∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.08 0.22∗∗ −0.05
(5) Mankind’s Knowledge 26 (19) 0.05 −0.04 0.11 0.08
(6) Optimism 3.4 (0.78) 0.03 −0.13 −0.14∗
(7) Consensus 93 (12) 0.16∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(8) Non-consensus 47 (21) 0.20∗∗
(9) Illusion 77 (31)
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
TABLE 3 | Spearman’s rho correlations between the individual difference variables and the answerability ratings of the consensus, non-consensus, and
illusion questions on the future answerability scale.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
(1) Belief in certainty of knowledge 0.30∗∗ −0.04 0.32∗∗ 0.18∗∗ −0.05 0.11 −0.10 0.07
(2) EPI-default −0.23∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.02 0.09 −0.03 −0.13
(3) EPI-intellectual 0.11∗ −0.06 −0.06 0.01 −0.01 0.19∗∗
(4) Mankind’s efficacy 0.15∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.05 −0.15∗ −0.01
(5) Mankind’s knowledge 0.04 0.11 −0.15∗ −0.14∗
(6) Optimism −0.02 0.00 −0.05
(7) Consensus 0.10 0.10
(8) Non-consensus 0.06
(9) Illusion
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
various individual diﬀerence variables and the level of the
answerability judgments.
Questions rated low on answerability on the current scale
were also rated to be answerable further oﬀ in the future. The
ﬁnding that the level of judged answerability was fairly strongly
correlated between the two scales indicates that there is some
stability in the processes generating answerability judgments.
This result is also in line with the conclusion reached byHampton
et al. (2012) that people in the context of general knowledge
statements can show agreement on what are known unknowns.
However, as discussed below, some diﬀerences were found
between the two scales with respect to their sensitivity for the
participants’ thought activity prior to making the answerability
judgment.
The consensus questions were rated as having a high level of
answerability and were, as expected, judged as more answerable
than the non-consensus questions, independent of the scale used.
A possible explanation for the high ratings of the consensus
questions is that fairly automated memory processes more often
quickly identiﬁed a correct answer or classiﬁed the consensus
questions as being a type of question that could be known by
myself or by others. This explanation coheres with research on
“don’t know” judgments which shows that spontaneous quick
processes may quickly contribute to the assessment of many
questions (e.g., Glucksberg and McCloskey, 1981). Results that
also supported the importance of quick automatic processes
when answering questions were reported by Reder and Ritter
(1992). These researchers found that people, when answering a
question, ﬁrst evaluate the question by using a type of feeling
of knowing judgment based on the features of the questions
asked. Our suggested explanation is also in line with Koriat’s
(2012) ﬁnding that experienced consensus about an answer was
associated with increased conﬁdence that the answer was correct.
The non-consensus questions were given the lowest
answerability ratings of the three question types. In line
with the considerations above, the answerability ratings for these
questions may have been more dependent on elaborated and
deliberative thinking, compared to the consensus questions. For
example, it is likely that there was less experienced consensus
about a possible answer to many of these questions and that for
this reason the advice oﬀered from socially prevalent knowledge
(compare Koriat, 2008, 2012; Shtulman, 2013) may have been
less obvious or clear, thus increasing the possibility that the
participants will engage in more independent deliberative
thinking. The possibility that the answerability judgments
for the consensus and non-consensus questions may have
been inﬂuenced by somewhat diﬀerent processes was also
indicated by the ﬁnding, further discussed below, that the
individual diﬀerence variables were mostly associated with the
non-consensus questions.
Many participants rated the illusion questions as answerable
today even though crucial information was missing. The results
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for the illusion questions indicate that a “feeling of others
knowing” can be created even when it is unlikely that somebody
can come up with an answer. The participants who were tricked
by the illusion questions showed tendencies to have an epistemic
preference for higher default processing in combination with
lower intellectual processing. High answerability judgments for
the illusion questions may therefore possibly be explained by
shallow processing based on general beliefs (Bromme et al., 2010),
in contrast to deeper processing of the actual question item per
se. Interestingly, participants who failed to notice the missing
information in the illusion questions also rated other questions
either higher or equally high in answerability.
Individual Difference Measures and the
Answerability Judgments
Overall, the individual diﬀerence variables all showed acceptable
or satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha values and were moderately
related to answerability judgments. In line with our hypothesis,
when an eﬀect was found it was related to the answerability
of non-consensus questions, not to the consensus questions.
However, it should be noted that the weaker correlations for the
consensus questions may also be due to their lower variability,
compared with that of the non-consensus questions and this issue
should be further explored in future research.
Together the individual diﬀerence variables explained 13% of
the variance of the answerability judgments for non-consensus
questions when the current scale was used. This can be seen as an
irrelevant inﬂuence on the level of the answerability judgments
in the sense that variance in individual diﬀerence variables is
not usually considered likely to contribute to better quality in
judgments, that is, more realistic values. Future research should
investigate if there are speciﬁc levels of some individual diﬀerence
variables that are beneﬁcial for producing realistic answerability
judgments. Generally speaking, in important applied contexts
it may be worthwhile to develop approaches that can help to
decrease the negative inﬂuence of individual diﬀerence variables.
It is also noteworthy that the participants who believed
more in certainty of knowledge also rated the more challenging
questions (the non-consensus questions) as more answerable,
especially for the current scale, providing some support for
our hypothesis. They also tended to believe more in mankind’s
knowledge (that more is known of all there is to know and that is
important to know) and especially to believe more in mankind’s
eﬃcacy with respect to solving diﬃcult problems and troubles.
These associations may also have contributed to the tendency
for participants who believed more in mankind’s knowledge
and eﬃcacy to give higher answerability ratings. Future research
should investigate whether people who believe more in certainty
of knowledge and mankind’s eﬃcacy diﬀer from other people in
the realism of their answerability judgments. For example, do
such people, when they consider real-life complex issues, have a
tendency to underestimate the number of variables relevant to
consider or the complexity of the possible interactions between
variables?
When it comes to epistemic preferences, we expected that
preference for default processing would be associated with higher
answerability judgments and intellectual processing with lower
answerability judgments. Although the earlier mentioned result
showed that participants high in default processing and low
in intellectual processing were tricked more by the illusion
questions, only a weak correlation was found between intellectual
processing and low answerability for the illusion questions when
using the future scale. Although it was small, this correlation
supports our hypothesis. Since people high in intellectual
processing enjoy and take time to think about problems
(Elphinstone et al., 2014), it is likely that these individuals
identiﬁed that the illusion questions lacked a component to be
answerable.
The results for the relation between personal optimism and
answerability generally showed quite weak correlations which
became signiﬁcant or non-signiﬁcant depending on method of
analysis. Optimism was also signiﬁcantly, but weakly, correlated
with lower answerability ratings on the non-consensus and the
illusion questions for the current answerability scale. According
to Peterson (2000) personal optimism is characterized by either
explanatory style or dispositional optimism. Explanatory style
relates to how the individual tends to explain good or bad
outcomes and may be less relevant to the present study.
Dispositional optimism means a tendency to expect good things
and few bad things to happen in the future, to believe that
one can reach one’s goals (e.g., optimism correlated between
r = 0.2–0.6 with self-eﬃcacy in diﬀerent countries in the study
by Luszczynska et al., 2005), to make more attempts to reach
one’s goals and to not give up. Similarly, research has found
optimism to correlate with overconﬁdence (Wolfe and Grosch,
1990). These features would seem to indicate that optimists would
show a tendency to give higher answerability ratings. However,
optimists can also be expected to be able to recognize and tolerate
higher degrees of uncertainty since they expect outcomes to be
good. In line with this, Scheier et al. (1986) found optimists
to be associated with less denial/distancing. Since the tendency
in the correlations both for the non-consensus and the illusion
questions was that optimists tended to give low answerability
ratings, this later tendency showed to be more important than the
ﬁrst listed features of personal optimism for determining the level
of the answerability judgments. However, the empirical evidence
for this conclusion should be replicated with new samples and
questions in future research.
As already noted, the results showed that answerability
judgments of the consensus questions were not appreciably
inﬂuenced by the individual diﬀerence variables. This could be
due to a ceiling eﬀect since the consensus questions received very
high ratings, limiting the spread of their answerability ratings.
However, the fact that the answerability ratings for the two types
of questions were signiﬁcantly correlated (see Table 2) speaks
against this interpretation, although this correlation, in spite of
it being signiﬁcant, was relatively low. It would seem more likely
that the lack of associations between the consensus questions
and the individual diﬀerence variables is a true eﬀect in the
sense that individual diﬀerence variables, for reasons discussed
above, may have had less inﬂuence on the judgments of these
questions, although future research should examine this issue
further.
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Interestingly, rating belief in certainty of knowledge before
judging the answerability questions on the future answerability
scale made participants think the non-consensus questions
were more answerable. The correlations between mankind’s
knowledge and mankind’s eﬃcacy and answerability of the
non-consensus questions were also more pronounced when
the ratings about belief in certainty of knowledge were made
before answering the answerability questions. Given the general
activating eﬀect of priming in memory (Tulving and Schacter,
1990), one can speculate that making ratings about certainty
of knowledge by evaluating positively formulated statements
about the possibility to ﬁnd the truth, as was the case in the
present study, may have inﬂuenced the information activated
in the participants’ memory. For example, it may have made
the participants who rated their belief in certainty of knowledge
before the answerability ratings attend more to all the things
mankind knows and can do, taking focus away from human
knowledge ﬂaws and this may have contributed to higher
answerability ratings.
Limitations and Further Research
The present study represents an early attempt to investigate some
aspects of question answerability judgments and has various
limitations. The results showed that our participants had a fairly
sanguine view of the answerability of the questions we tested, as
most of the questions were seen as answerable today or in the
future. Most of the questions’ answerability was considered just
a matter of time, and not beyond human reach. However, the
participants in our study (being members of our participant pool)
can be argued to have a fairly positive attitude toward research
and science. Future research should test if our results generalize
to more representative groups of people and to people faced with
uncertain but important questions, for example, researchers and
politicians. Furthermore, future research should preferably use
a larger number of answerability questions, especially a larger
number of illusion questions.
Finally, future research should also investigate people’s
answerability judgments of other types of questions than in
the present study. Examples are questions relating to current
controversies in science and questions more clearly related to
social life, such as questions whether a suspect can be considered
guilty “beyond reasonable doubt” (see e.g., Dhami, 2008),
questions concerning the eﬀects of previous or planned social
reforms in diﬀerent societal contexts, and questions relating to
scientiﬁc issues and supernatural issues.
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APPENDIX 1
Questions
The questions were presented in following domains: Swedish
grammar, Space, Geometry, South-American history, Galaxies,
Physics, Medicine, Diseases, Climate science, Tics, and
Technology. Three categories of questions were used: consensus,
non-consensus, and consensus illusion. Respondents were
asked to make judgment of answerability either on a current
answerability scale or a future answerability scale. A complete
list of the questions with question category in parenthesis follows
below.
Consensus Questions
• What word-class does the word beautiful belong to? (Swedish
grammar)
• What is the name of our galaxy? (Galaxies)
• What is a super-nova? (Space)
• The formula for a circumference of a circle is denoted π∗D.
What does D stand for? (Geometry)
• How large is the voltage if the electric current is 10 amp and
the resistance 15 k? (Physics)
• The virus that causes chicken pox can also cause another
illness. Which one? (Diseases)
• What is the branch of medicine that deals with the uses, eﬀects,
and modes of drugs called with another word? (Medicine)
• What century did Columbus start the European colonization
of South America? (South-American history)
Non-Consensus Questions
• How many varieties of the word “snow” did humans have
during the ice age? (Swedish grammar)
• How many galaxies are there in the universe? (Galaxies)
• What proportion of all diseases has psychological causes?
(Diseases)
• How many varieties of bacteria can be transmitted to humans
via tics? (Tics)
• Howmuch environmentally hazardousmaterial does the anno
2014 most common laptop contain? (Technology)
• Are humans causing global warming? (Climate science)
• Will the polar ices melt in before year 2514? (Climate science)
• Is there life in space? (Space)
• Is there anno 2014 a safe technology for storing nuclear waste?
(Technology)
• Does the vaccination used year 2014 provide a safe protection
against the disease TBE, submitted via tics? (Tics)
• Does the human body anno 2014 have a so far unknown
circulation system? (Medicine)
• Did the Maya Indians have any knowledge about the end of
the world? (South-American history).
Illusion Questions
• How large is the area of an ellipse with a minor axis of 2 cm?
(Geometry)
• How large is the electric eﬀect at a voltage of 100 V? (Physics)
APPENDIX 2
Instructions to Current Answerability
Judgments
For each question we would like you to answer how probable
it is that the question is possible to answer. We are thus not
asking for the particular answer, but what you believe about
the answerability of the question. In order to make the question
count as 100% answerable it is enough that at least one now
living person in the whole world can answer the question. Zero
percent means that nobody can answer the question. You can
also choose a probability between 0 and 100%, e.g., the probability
that the question is answerable is 90%. With 100% we mean that
the question can be answered in a correct way and that you can
provide good arguments for the answer.
Instructions to Future Answerability
Judgments
For each question we would like you to answer if the question
is possible to answer and in that case when. We are thus not
asking for the particular answer but what you think about the
question’s answerability. That is, is there anyone who can answer
the question today, in the future, or will the question never be
answered?
In order to make the question count as answerable it is
enough that at least one person in the whole world can answer
the question. With answerability we mean that the question
can be answered in a correct way and that you can provide
good argument for the answer. Answer options will be presented
on a timescale. . . the alternatives on the time-scale are mutually
exclusive. That is, “within 1 year” means 0–1 year, “within
10 years” means 2–10 years, and “within 20 years” means
11–20 years, etc. . .
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APPENDIX 3
FIGURE A1 | Means and standard deviations for the answerability judgments on the current answerability scale. The standard deviation reflects the
variability of each response for each individual across the sample of individuals. Consensus questions are marked with “C”, Non-consensus questions with “NC”,
and Illusion questions with “I”.
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